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Abstract
Recent evaluations of active labor market policies are not very opti-
mistic about their eﬀectiveness to bring unemployed back to work. An
important reason is that unemployed get locked-in, that is they reduce
their eﬀort to ﬁnd a regular job. This paper uses an administrative
dataset from the Slovak Republic on durations of individual unemploy-
ment spells. The focus of the analysis is temporary subsidized jobs.
By exploiting the variation in the duration of these jobs it is possible
to investigate whether or not the locking-in eﬀect is important. It
turns out that it is.
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11 Introduction
Active labor market policies (ALMP) aim at bringing unemployed back to
work by improving the functioning of the labor market in various ways.
ALMP include programs such as public employment services, labor mar-
ket training and subsidized employment. The 1994 OECD Jobs study rec-
ommends governments to “strenghten the emphasis on active labor market
policies and reinforce their eﬀectiveness” (OECD, 1994). Recent studies how-
ever are not very optimistic about the beneﬁts of many of these programs.
Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström (2001) concludes that the evidence on
the eﬀectiveness of Swedish ALMP is rather disappointing. Labor market
retraining for example has no or negative employment eﬀects. Martin and
Grubb (2001) draw similar conclusions in their overview on what works and
what does not work among ALMP in OECD countries. They conclude for
example that subsidies to employment and direct job creation have been of
little success in helping unemployed get permanent jobs. An important draw-
back of a lot of ALMP is that they stimulate workers to reduce their search
eﬀorts in stead of increasing them. This is due to the so-called locking-in
eﬀect.
This paper focuses on the locking in eﬀects of temporary subsidized jobs.
The analysis is based on information linked to a “natural” experiment that
took place in the Slovak labor market in the mid 1990s. At that time there
were two types of temporary subsidized jobs known as socially purposeful jobs
(SPJ) and publicly useful jobs (PUJ). SPJ were mainly created in the private
sector and concerned higher qualiﬁed functions while PUJ were low rank-
ing jobs in the public sector best described as “community works” (OECD
(1996)). The maximum duration of PUJ changed from 6 months to 9 months
in 1994 and from 9 months to 12 months in 1995, while the minimum dura-
tion of SPJ remained 24 months over the same time period. This paper uses
an administrative dataset from the Slovak Republic on durations of individ-
2ual unemployment spells and exploits the change in the duration of PUJ to
investigate the locking-in eﬀect. If indeed this eﬀect exists the eﬀectiveness
of PUJ to bring unemployed back to regular jobs should have decreased as
the duration of the jobs increased.
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 discusses active labor market
policies both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Section 3
provides a description of the nature of the Slovak “natural” experiment. This
section gives a short overview of labor market developments, the ALMP in
Slovakia and previous studies on the eﬀectiveness of these ALMP. Section
4 presents the data and the statistical model and Section 5 presents the
parameter estimates. Section 6 concludes.
2 Active labor market policies
2.1 The function of ALMP
Active labor market policies consist of public training programs, job search
assistance, subsidies to employment and direct job creation. Calmfors (1995)
distinguishes four basic functions of ALMP: i) raise output (and welfare)
by putting unemployed to work or have them invest in human capital, ii)
maintain the size of the eﬀective labor force by keeping up competition for
available jobs, iii) help to reallocate labor between diﬀerent sub-markets, iv)
alleviate the moral-hazard problem of unemployment insurance. ALMP may
eliminate mismatch in the labor market, promote more active search behavior
on the part of the job seekers and have a screening function because they sub-
stitute for regular work experience in reducing employer uncertainty about
the employability of job applicants. Placements in labor market programs
may provide an alternative work test to the eligibility of unemployment ben-
eﬁts, since some of those who are not genuinely interested in work will prefer
to lose registration rather than to participate in a program. An adverse side
3eﬀe c to fA L M Pi st h a tw o r k e r sa r el o c k e d - in training and job-creation pro-
grams: because of their participation they reduce their search intensity. Not
only direct eﬀects are important when assessing the eﬀectiveness of ALMP.
Calmfors (1994) distinguishes a number of indirect eﬀects. First there are
displacement eﬀects since jobs created by one program are at the expense
of other jobs. Then there are deadweight eﬀects because labor market pro-
grams subsidize hiring that would have occurred anyway in the absence of
the program. There are also substitution eﬀects because jobs created for a
certain category of workers replace jobs for other categories because relative
wage costs have changed. Finally, there are the eﬀects of taxation required
to ﬁnance the programs on the behavior of everyone in society.
2.2 Empirical studies
In line with the previous distinction between micro and macro eﬀects there
are two main types of evaluation studies of ALMP (Martin and Grubb, 2001):
The ﬁrst type uses micro data to measure the impact of program participation
on individuals’ employment and earnings. The second type uses aggregate
data to measure the net eﬀects of programs on aggregate employment and
unemployment. Micro studies have the advantage of a very large number
of observations. Drawbacks are the selection bias and the fact that they
provide only estimates of partial-equilibrium eﬀects. Macro studies are few.
Drawbacks of macro studies are that they are based on few observations,
they often lump together various types of training and job creation schemes
and they have to deal with a simultaneity bias.
There are many evaluation studies. A lot of them are done in Sweden, a
country that has used ALMP extensively. In their overview of Swedish studies
Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström (2001) concludes that ALMP have proba-
bly reduced unemployment but also reduced regular employment. According
to Martin and Grubb (2001) the lessons from the evaluation studies in OECD
countries are the following. Public training programs are among the most
4expensive active measures. Some programs have yielded low or even negative
rates of return for participants, some public training programs work. These
programs appear to work for some target groups (adult women) but not for
others (prime-age men, youth). Four crucial features can increase eﬀective-
ness: tight targeting on participants, relative small scale, need to results in a
qualiﬁcation or certiﬁcate that is recognized and valued by the market, strong
on-the-job component (establishing strong links with local employers). Job
search assistance is usually the least costly active labor market program but
must be combined with increased monitoring of the job-search behavior of the
unemployed and enforcement of work tests. Subsidies to employment involve
large dead weight losses and substitution eﬀects. Finally, direct job creation
has been of little success in helping unemployed get permanent jobs in the
open labor market. Most jobs provided through direct job creation schemes
typically have a low marginal product, they should be short in duration and
not become a disguised form of heavily subsidized permanent employment.
3 The Slovak natural experiment
3.1 Labor market developments and ALMP
The Slovak labor market is one of the transitional labor markets of Central
and Eastern Europe (see Svejnar (1999) for an overview). Like many other
countries with a transitional economy, Slovakia experienced a sharp increase
of unemployment at the initial stage of the transition. In the course of 1991,
within a one-year time span unemployment increased from practically zero
to 300,000 persons which corresponded to an unemployment rate of about
12% (OECD 1996). After that unemployment did not change a lot until it
started increasing again in 1998. In 2001 the unemployment rate was as high
as 18.8% (OECD 2001).
The Slovak Republic has a system of passive and active labor market
5policies. The system of unemployment beneﬁts in the Slovak Republic has
been discussed elsewhere (for a detailed description of institutions see OECD
(1996)). For the current paper I only note that for many unemployed workers
replacement rates are quite high. Even for average wage jobs the replacement
rate for adults with children and unemployment beneﬁts was no less than
about 80%. After transfer to the social assistance beneﬁts their replacement
rate was about 50-60% (for more details see Lubyova and Van Ours (1997,
1998)).
ALMP were introduced in 1991 and gradually developed into a compre-
hensive system of several programs. Important programs were temporary
subsidized jobs known as SPJ and PUJ (OECD (1996)). The volume of both
SPJ and PUJ was quite large. In 1995 for example in total 47,000 workers
started working on a SPJ, while 44,000 started working on a PUJ (Lubyova
and Van Ours, 1999).
SPJ were the most important throughout the period, both in terms of
number of created jobs and expenditures. The concept of SPJ and the rules of
administration have undergone numerous revisions as the authorities learned
how to tailor the programs to labor market conditions. In 1991 SPJ were
considered to be every job created on the basis of an agreement with the
labor oﬃce by an employer in production, business or other activities aimed
at making proﬁts. In 1992 the proﬁt-seeking requirement was eliminated and
t h er e q u i r e m e n tt h a tt h ej o bh a dt ob eo c c u p i e db yr e g i s t e r e du n e m p l o y e d
was introduced. The latter was partially relaxed in 1994 when the school-
leavers, persons younger than 18 years and those who would be full-time
self-employed under SPJ were allowed to participate without prior registra-
tion. The main forms of support introduced in 1991 were subsidies, interest
repayments and loans, later reduced to 2-years loans and subsidies. The
m i n i m u md u r a t i o no fS P Jw a si n t r o d u c e di n1 9 9 2a n ds e tt o2 - y e a r sp e r i o d .
In case of lay-oﬀ or quit, the job had to be occupied by another registered
unemployed within 30 days.
6Publicly useful jobs were designed mostly for lower qualiﬁed workers for a
limited period of time. In 1991 PUJ were introduced as short-term employ-
ment opportunities created on the basis of agreements between labor oﬃces
and non-proﬁt employers (for example, organs of state administration, mu-
nicipalities, and local administration). The requirement for non-proﬁto r i e n -
tation of the employer was canceled in 1992. State budgetary organizations
and state contributory (partial budgetary) organizations were excluded from
PUJ programs in 1994. The upper limit for ﬁnancial support was originally
set at the wage costs of the participant, later extended to cover also par-
ticipant’s social insurance contributions. The maximum duration of PUJ in
1991 was 6 months. Given that the participation renewed unemployment
beneﬁt entitlement, many unemployed workers were shifting between PUJ
and open unemployment. Therefore, the maximum duration of PUJ was
raised to 9 months January 1 1994 and to 12 months January 1 1995. The
stocks were strongly built up after two major inﬂo w so fa b o u tt h es a m es i z e ,
w h i c ho c c u r r e di nt h eﬁnancing boom of 1992, and in the ﬁrst half of 1995.
The latter inﬂow was a result of changed priorities in 1995 - more means were
put into PUJ, partly at the expense of other programs.
T h ei m p l e m e n t a t i o no fA L M Pw a si nt h eh a n d so ft h eP u b l i cE m p l o y m e n t
Service (PES) that had a network of district oﬃces where every district oﬃce
had a number of local centers. So, the services were never far away (OECD
(1996)). Although priority of placement was given to long-term unemployed
workers, the target group of the wage subsidies was not limited to the long-
term unemployed. Every unemployed person who could not get a normal job
was entitled to a subsidized job oﬀered through the PES system. According
to the OECD (1996) the incentive to establish a subsidized job usually came
from interested employers. Among the subsidized jobs were jobs that required
no special training and education, including caretaking, cleaning, kitchen
work and unskilled jobs in general. The creation of subsidized jobs was a
matter of negotiation between employers and PES. The wage subsidy was
7granted to individuals but paid to the employer. The wage was comparable
to other workers that had a low skilled industrial job and was usually at the
minimum wage or somewhat above. This means that for some workers the
replacement rate was quite high. If someone refused a job oﬀered by the PES
he or she may have gotten a beneﬁt sanction imposed but the labor oﬃces
were usually reluctant to use this instrument.
In 1997 the structure of ALMP programs was substantially reformed. The
original SPJ and PUJ were formally uniﬁed into one program of subsidized
jobs, although some distinction between the two types of jobs was preserved.
3.2 Previous studies
There have been some studies on the impact of ALMP in transition economies,
but there is not an abundant number. From an overview of studies on labor-
market reforms in transition economics Boeri (1997) concludes that active
policies, such as subsidized employment schemes and public work programs
have not been very successful. According to Boeri this may have to do with
the phenomenon that slots in training courses are often oﬀered to job seekers
with rather favorable labor market characteristics who would have found a
job anyway. Furthermore, participation in ALMP may have stigmatized the
participants, which reduced their chances of ﬁnding a regular job. The eﬀec-
tiveness of Slovak labor market policies has been investigated in a number
of studies. Burda and Lubyova (1995) use district aggregate data to esti-
mate the eﬀectiveness of Slovak ALMP in a matching function framework.
They ﬁnd that ALMP expenditures increase the outﬂow from unemployment.
Huitfeld (2000) investigates to what extent ALMP created wage pressure and
crowded out regular employment in Slovakia. He ﬁnds evidence that indeed
ALMP have had a positive impact on wages.
In Lubyova and Van Ours (1999) the eﬀects of PUJ, SPJ and training on
the transition rate from unemployment to a regular job are investigated. The
main conclusions are that PUJ have a positive eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate
8while SPJ have a negative eﬀect. In Van Ours (2000) the eﬀects of ALMP are
studied more closely, by also investigating whether the separation rate from
a new job is related to whether or not the worker previously participated in
an ALMP. Here the conclusion is that PUJ reduce the job separation rate.
The current paper focuses on the job ﬁnding rate. The main issue addressed
here is the question why PUJ have a positive eﬀect on the job-ﬁnding rate
w h i l eS P Jh a v ean e g a t i v ee ﬀect. The locking-in eﬀect is the main suspect.
4D a t a a n d s t a t i s t i c a l m o d e l
4.1 Data
The data used in our analysis come from the unemployment registers of
labor oﬃces in 16 Slovak districts. The unemployment rates diﬀer a lot
between districts. For example, in the district Bratislava (excluding the
capital Bratislava) the December 1993 unemployment rate was 4.1%, while
in the Bardejov the unemployment rate at that time was 19.3%.
In the selected districts the data collection was exhaustive, i.e. all the
registered unemployed were selected. Several types of information are used
in order to reconstruct individual histories. An individual history consists of
a sequence of spells representing three possible labor market states: employ-
ment, unemployment and out of labor force. In addition to that the spells
of participation in SPJ and PUJ programs are identiﬁed. From the unem-
ployment register and unemployment archives an inﬂow sample was selected
of all the unemployed that became registered in the course of 1993. The
censoring point is April 1998. The use of 1993 inﬂow is justiﬁed by the rel-
ative stability in the institutional set-up of the labor market (major reforms
occurred at the beginning of 1992 and 1995). Also the time period elapsed
before the censoring point is suﬃciently large to avoid a lot of censored spells.
In the analysis information is used about the length of the ﬁrst spell of un-
9employment that started in 1993. If this spell ended information is used
about the labor market status after unemployment. If the spell ended in a
transition to a job the unemployment spell was considered to be completed.
If the spell ended in a transition to an ALMP-program the unemployment
duration was considered to continue until another transition occurred either
to a job or back to unemployment. This concept does not coincide with the
oﬃcial statistics but it does coincide with the point of view of a labor econo-
mist: a person is unemployed until he or she ﬁnds a regular job or leaves
the labor market. When a transition to a job occurred the unemployment
spell was considered to be complete. When a transition occurred back to
unemployment the spell was still considered to be incomplete. In the analy-
sis the duration of unemployment up to a transition to an ALMP-job or to
training is also important. This duration is the search period until an ALMP
measure is met. If the spell did not end or ended in a transition to out of
the labor force the unemployment spell is considered to be right censored.
The procedure to deal with duration information can be illustrated in two
examples. If an individual ﬁrst starts in a SPJ and then ﬁnds a regular job
the situation is as follows:
Labor market states U SPJ E
Durations ←− tu −→
←− ts −→
where U indicates the unemployment state, SPJ the state of being in an SPJ
and E indicates the employment state. Furthermore, tu is the duration until
an individual ﬁnds a job and ts is the duration until an individual starts
working in a SPJ. If the individual returns to unemployment after having
been in a SPJ and then ﬁnds a job, the situation is as follows:
Labor market states U SPJ U E
Durations ←− tu −→
←− ts −→
10After removing missing observations the data from the 16 districts refer to
86,157 individuals of which 49,378 are male and 36,779 are female. Table 1
gives some indication about the transitions in labor market statuses that were
used in the analysis. As is shown on average 2.9% of them started in a SPJ,
3.7% started in a PUJ and 47.1% started in a regular job right after their
unemployment spell ended. Of those that started in a SPJ 74.4% started
in a regular job without or with an intervening spell of unemployment. Of
those that started in a PUJ 48.4% started in a regular job within the time
period that was observed.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the exit rates out of unemployment over
the duration of the unemployment spell. Figure 1a shows that for males the
transition rate to a regular job decreases in the ﬁrst year and then ﬂuctuates
around a sort of constant level of about 3-4% per month. The transition
r a t e st oS P Ja r ea l m o s tc o n s t a n ti nt h eﬁrst three years of the unemployment
spell while the transition rates to PUJ increase strongly. After one year the
transition rate to PUJ is higher than the transition rate to SPJ but both are
substantially below the transition rates to regular jobs. Figure 1b shows the
transition rates for females. The patterns are roughly the same for females
but all transition rates are lower than they are for males. Furthermore, the
transition rate to a regular job keeps falling after one year of unemployment.
Figure 2 shows the transition rates to a regular job, from a SPJ, a PUJ
and from unemployment.1 For both males and females the transition rates
from a SPJ and a PUJ ﬂuctuate substantially over the duration of the stay
on these jobs. For the transitions from PUJ there are clear peaks at 6, 9 and
12 months.
1Note that the transition rate from unemployment to a regular job is similar for Figures
1 and 2. The PUJ and SPJ lines are calculated on the basis of 1519 males and 1001 females
that started on a SPJ, and on the basis of 2348 males and 831 females that started on a
PUJ.
114.2 Statistical model
The job ﬁnding rate consists of two components: the search intensity and
the job oﬀer probability. Going into a subsidized job has two opposite eﬀect
with respect to the job ﬁnding rate. First, accepting a subsidized job is a
signal to the employer of the ambition of the worker to go for a job and not
rely on unemployment beneﬁts. This increases the job oﬀer probability and
conditional on the search intensity also the job ﬁnding rate. The second eﬀect
concerns the search intensity. If the subsidized job lasts for a long time the
worker may reduce his or her search intensity. Conditional on the job oﬀer
probability this has a negative eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate. The net eﬀect
of a subsidized job is the balance of the increased job oﬀer probability and
the decreased search intensity. Whether the net eﬀect is positive or negative
depends on the way the subsidized job is structured. If subsidized jobs last
too long the reduced search intensity dominates and the net eﬀect will be
negative. If subsidized jobs are limited in time the positive eﬀect of the
increased job oﬀer probability dominates and the net eﬀect is positive. Since
there is not information about search intensities or job oﬀer probabilities only
the net eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate can be established.
In order to establish the eﬀect of a subsidized job on the exit rate to a
regular job a model is needed that accounts for possible selectivity in the
inﬂow into a subsidized job. Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) gives an
overview of the relevant issues concerning the estimation of treatment eﬀects.
Studies that estimate the eﬀects of the treatment in the context of an event
history model of labor force dynamics are rare. The current analysis exploits
information with respect to the duration of unemployment, the duration of
the stay in a subsidized job and the destinations after that. In multivariate
duration models the variation in the durations at which treatment is adminis-
tered to individuals, and data on the corresponding pre- and post-treatment
durations can be exploited to identify the treatment eﬀect. The intuition
is as follows. Consider the transition rate from unemployment to a regu-
12lar job, which is aﬀected by unobserved heterogeneity that has a discrete
distribution with two points of support. Consider also the transition rate
from unemployment to a subsidized job that is aﬀected by a similar type of
unobserved heterogeneity. If the two types of unobserved heterogeneity are
correlated this means that conditional on observed characteristics there are
four groups of individuals that diﬀer in terms of transition to a job (high/low)
and transition to a subsidized job (high/low). Conditional on observed char-
acteristics each of these four groups is homogenous. So, within the groups
selectivity of the inﬂow into a subsidized job cannot be present. Therefore,
we are able to estimate the unbiased treatment eﬀect if we can identify the
unobserved heterogeneity in both the transition rate to a regular job and the
transition rate to subsidized jobs. This means that the data should contain
information about all relevant transitions over some period of time, which
they do.
A formal proof of the identiﬁcation of the treatment eﬀect is given in
Abbring and Van den Berg (1998). Van den Berg (2000) presents an overview
of duration models and has a general discussion on the use of duration models
in estimating treatment eﬀects. Examples of the use of multivariate duration
models in evaluation studies are Gritz (1993), Bonnal, Fougère and Sérandon
(1997), Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997), Van den Berg, Van der
Klaauw and Van Ours (1998). These and other studies are discussed in
more detail in Van Ours (2000). A recent example of a study in which a
multivariate duration model is exploited to estimate the eﬀects of ALMP is
Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimüller (2000).
Here, the baseline model has for every transition rate a mixed propor-
tional speciﬁcation with a ﬂexible baseline hazard. Diﬀerences between un-
employed individuals in the transition rate from unemployment to a job can
be characterized by the time invariant observed characteristics x, the elapsed
duration of unemployment t , and a variable indicating whether or not the
individual started participating in an ALMP. Furthermore, tj (j = p,s, refer-
13ring to PUJ or SPJ) is the time at which the individual starts participating
in a subsidized job and Ij is the dummy variable indicating whether the in-
dividual has already started participating, Ij =1if tj <t , Ij =0otherwise.
Similar speciﬁcations are used for both transition rates to PUJ and SPJ.
E a c ho ft h et r a n s i t i o nr a t e sm a yb ei n ﬂuenced by unobserved characteristics,
indicated by u for the transition to regular jobs, v for the transition to PUJ
and w for the transition to SPJ.
The transition rate from unemployment to a regular job at time t con-
ditional on x, tp, ts and v, the transition rates to PUJ or SPJ at time t
conditional on x and v or w can be speciﬁed as follows:
θu(t|x,Ip,I s,u)=λu(t)exp(x
0βu + δpIp + δsIs + u)
θp(t|x,v)=λp(t)exp(x
0βp + v) (1)
θs(t|x,w)=λs(t)exp(x
0βs + w)
where the λ(t)-functions represent individual duration dependence and the
δ
0s measure the eﬀect that taking up a temporary subsidized job has on
the transition rate from unemployment to a regular job. In both cases the
treatment is assumed to be an “incidence eﬀect” (Gritz (1993)) . There could
be a lot of aspects of the ALMP that potentially aﬀect the transition rate to a
regular job, but only the eﬀect of the participation in an ALMP is taken into
account. Flexible duration dependence is modeled by using step functions:
λj(t)=e x p ( Σk(λj,k · Ik(t)) for j = u,p,s (2)
where k (= 1,..,6) is a subscript for time-interval and Ik(t) are time-varying
dummy variables that are one in subsequent time-intervals. Six time intervals
are distinguished: 0-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-9 months, 9-12 months, 12-
24 months and 24+ months. Because a constant term is also estimated a
normalization is needed. Therefore, λu,1 = λp,1 = λs,1 =0 .
The conditional density functions of the completed unemployment dura-
tions tu, and the completed durations until entrance of a PUJ or SPJ can be
14written as
fu(tu|x,Ip,I s,u)=θu(tu|x,Ip,I s,u)exp(−
Z tu
0
θu(r|x,Ip,I s,u)dr) (3)
fp(tp|x,v)=θp(tp|x,v)exp(−
Z tp
0
θp(q|x,v)dq) (4)
fs(ts|x,w)=θs(ts|x,w)exp(−
Z ts
0
θs(s|x,w)ds) (5)
The basic assumption so far is that the inﬂow into a subsidized job is a
random process in the sense that it is independent of the process by which
unemployed ﬁnd jobs.
The selection into the subsidized jobs is not exogenous or independent
of unobserved characteristics that also aﬀect the job ﬁnding rate. To ac-
count for this selectivity the unobserved heterogeneity terms are allowed to
be correlated. G(u,v,w) is deﬁned to be the joint distribution of the unob-
served characteristics u, v and w. The joint density function of tu, tp and ts
conditional on x equals
h(tu,t p,t s|x)=
Z
u
Z
v
Z
w
fu(tu|x,Ip,I s,u)fp(tp|x,v)fs(ts|x,w)dG(u,v,w)
(6)
Each of the error terms is assumed to follow a discrete distribution with two
points of support a and b, and each error term can be correlated to another.
Therefore, G is a discrete distribution of unobserved heterogeneity with eight
points of support (ua,v a,w a), (ua,v a,w b), (ua,v b,w a), (ua,v b,w b), (ub,v a,w a),
(ub,v a,w b), (ub,v b,w a), (ub,v b,w b).
The associated probabilities are denoted as follows:
Pr(ua,v a,w a)=p1 Pr(ua,v a,w b)=p2
Pr(ua,v b,w a)=p3 Pr(ua,v b,w b)=p4
Pr(ub,v a,w a)=p5 Pr(ub,v a,w b)=p6 (7)
Pr(ub,v b,w a)=p7 Pr(ub,v b,w b)=p8
15where 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, and i =1 ,..,8. So, the assumption is that there are 8
subgroups within the population of unemployed workers that conditional on
their observed characteristics and their elapsed duration are homogeneous
w i t h i nt h eg r o u p ,b u td i ﬀerent between. These groups are not observed but
the fact that they are homogenous is used to get an unbiased estimate of the
treatment eﬀects.
The observations can be divided into three groups. There are individuals
that did not go into a PUJ or SPJ, N1 observations, individuals that go into
aP U J ,N2 observations and individuals that go into an SPJ, N3 observations.
If c =1when the outcome is a completed unemployment duration and c =0
when the unemployment duration is censored, then the loglikelihood is
N1 X
i=1
ln[ci
Z ∞
tpi
Z ∞
tsi
h(tui,s,q|xi)dsdq]+( 1− ci)
Z ∞
tui
Z ∞
tpi
Z ∞
tsi
h(r,s,q|xi)dsdqdr]
+
N2 X
i=1
ln[ci
Z ∞
tsi
h(tui,s,t pi|xi)ds +( 1− ci)
Z ∞
tui
Z ∞
tsi
h(r,s,tpi|xi)dsdr] (8)
+
N3 X
i=1
ln[ci
Z ∞
tpi
h(tui,t si,q|xi)dq]+( 1− ci)
Z ∞
tui
Z ∞
tpi
h(r,tsi,q|xi)dqdr]
5 Parameter estimates
The empirical analysis is done separately for males and females. For the
empirical analysis a 20% random sample is drawn from the available ob-
servations. This sample consists of 9,844 males and 7,327 females. In the
appendix in Table A1 the distribution of males and females across the dif-
ferent districts is shown both for the gross sample of 86,157 workers and
the net sample of 17,167 workers. The explanatory variables I use in the
analysis refer to age, education, marital status, disability status, ethnicity
and district unemployment rate. The appendix provides more details about
the explanatory variables. As is shown in Table A2 the age distribution of
males and females in the sample is approximately the same. Females are
16higher educated than males are. Of the females 44% has secondary or higher
education, while this is only 30% for males. Of the males 52% is married,
of the females this is 64%. Furthermore, the samples of males and females
contain about 5% disabled workers, 4% Roma and 6% Hungarians.
5.1 Treatment eﬀects
The parameters of the model are estimated using the method of maximum
likelihood.2 It turns out that is not possible to distinguish more than two
points of support in the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. These
two points are modeled by using a logit model, where p1 =
exp(α)
1+exp(α) and
p2 = 1
1+exp(α). Parameter estimates with this two point distribution are
s h o w ni nT a b l e2 . 3 First the results for males are discussed and then the
results for females.
As shown in Table 2a the exit rate to a job is lower for males over age
40 than it is for younger males. The level of education does not aﬀect the
transition rate to a job, but being married increases this transition rate.
Furthermore, disabled workers and workers with a Hungarian nationality
or Roma have a lower exit rate to a regular job than their counterparts
have. The district unemployment rate has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on
2Note that this set-up diﬀers from Lubyova and Van Ours (1999) is two ways. First,
training programs are omitted. Durations until training are considered to be right-censored
unemployment durations. Second, the transition rates to SPJ and PUJ are now modeled
separately in stead of as one exit into ALMPs.
3Table A3 in the appendix presents the estimation results if there is no account for
unobserved heterogeneity. As will be clear from a comparison of the parameter estimates
in this table and the parameter estimates in Table 2 introducing unobserved heterogeneity
does not aﬀect the coeﬃcients of the explanatory variables a lot. The pattern of duration
dependence of the transition rates changes somewhat. The main diﬀerence concerns the
treatment eﬀects. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity increases the eﬀect of PUJ
and decreases the eﬀect of SPJ. Without unobserved heterogeneity for both males and
females the eﬀect of PUJ would be positive but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. With
unobserved heterogeneity the eﬀect of PUJ is positive and signiﬁcant.
17the outﬂow to regular jobs. Unobserved heterogeneity is relevant, with a
group of 29% that has a low exit rate to a regular job and a group of 71%
of which the exit rate to a regular job is substantially higher. Duration
dependence is also relevant. Conditional on the observed and unobserved
characteristics the transition rate in the second duration interval is higher
than the transition rate to a regular job in the ﬁrst duration interval is.
From the third quarter up to two years the exit rate to a regular is smaller
than it is in the ﬁrst quarter. After that it increases again, possible because
unemployment beneﬁts expire. A lot of variables that have a positive eﬀect
on the transition rate to a regular job have a negative eﬀect on the outﬂow
to PUJ. Age for example has a positive eﬀect, while being married has a
negative eﬀect. Furthermore, education has a negative eﬀect on the outﬂow
to a PUJ, while unemployment has a positive eﬀect. These eﬀects are in
line with the purpose of PUJ, which were intended for low skilled, young
workers. In terms of unobserved heterogeneity regular jobs and PUJ are
also negatively correlated. If an individual belongs to a group that has a
high exit rate to a regular job he has a low exit rate to a PUJ and vice
versa. Since the number of workers going to a PUJ in the ﬁrst year of their
unemployment is very small the ﬁrst four duration intervals are merged.
As shown the exit rate to PUJ has a strong positive duration dependence.
Whereas regular jobs and PUJ seems to be complements, regular jobs and
SPJ seem to be substitutes. The exit rate to SPJ is lower for older, low
educated and unmarried males than it is for their counterparts. Roma men
have a lower transition rate to SPJ than other men have. A high district
unemployment rate has a negative but not signiﬁcant eﬀect on the transition
rate to SPJ. The unobserved components of the transition to regular jobs
are positively correlated with the unobserved components in the transition
t oS P J .T h o s et h a th a v eal o we x i tr a t et or e g u l a rj o b sh a v eaz e r oe x i tr a t e
to SPJ. Apparently, if workers are attractive for employers to hire them on
regular jobs they are also attractive for employers to hire them on SPJ. The
18treatment eﬀect of PUJ turns out to be positive, while the treatment eﬀect
of SPJ is negative.
As shown in Table 2b a lot but not all of the eﬀects of observed and
unobserved characteristics and of the duration of unemployment are similar
for females. In terms of unobserved heterogeneity there is a group of females
of 44% that has a small transition rate to regular jobs, a relatively large
transition rate to PUJ and a zero transition rate to SPJ. The complementary
group of 56% of the females has a larger transition rates to regular jobs, a
positive transition rate to SPJ and a zero transition rate to PUJ. Also for
females the treatment eﬀect of PUJ is positive, while the treatment eﬀect of
SPJ is negative.
5.2 Locking-in eﬀects?
From the estimation results presented in the previous subsection it is clear
that PUJ have a positive eﬀect on the transition rate from unemployment to
a regular job, while SPJ have a negative eﬀect. The question is whether this
has to do with a locking-in eﬀe c tt h a ti sm o r es e v e r et h el o n g e rt h ep o t e n t i a l
duration of a temporary subsidized job is. The diﬀerences in the potential
duration of a SPJ and a PUJ are used to identify the locking-in eﬀect. As
discussed before the potential duration of a PUJ changed in the period 1993-
95, while the potential duration of a SPJ remained constant over this period.
If there is a locking-in eﬀect related to the duration of a temporary job the
diﬀerence in treatment eﬀects between PUJ and SPJ should have declined
over the period 1993-95.
Table 3 shows the estimated treatment eﬀects distinguished by type of
program and by year of entrance into the programs. For males the treatment
eﬀect of PUJ is indeed lower in 1994 than it is in 1993, while it is again lower
in 1995. The treatment eﬀect of SPJ in 1995 is larger than it is in 1993,
but the diﬀerence is on the border line of signiﬁcance. So, t the treatment
eﬀect of SPJ does not diﬀer a lot across the years, while it becomes smaller
19for PUJ. From this convergence in the eﬀe c ti tm a yb ec o n c l u d e dt h a tt h e
duration of the subsidy is important. For females similar results are found.
Table 4 shows how the estimated treatment eﬀects depend on the ex
ante duration of the treatment. Here, the calendar year dummies have been
replaced by the ex ante duration of a subsidized job, which was 6 months
for PUJ that started in 1993, 9 months for PUJ that started in 1994, 12
months for PUJ that started in 1995 onwards, while for SPJ the ex ante
(minimum) duration was always 2 years. As shown the eﬀect of the ex
ante duration is signiﬁcantly negative, both for males and females. In both
cases the hypothesis that the year dummies may be replaced by the ex ante
duration cannot be rejected.4 Finally, Table 4 shows whether the size of
the treatment eﬀects is related to the observed characteristics of the workers
in the programs. For males the treatment eﬀect is larger for low educated
workers, unmarried workers and Roma. For females none of the coeﬃcients
diﬀers signiﬁcantly from zero.5
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper focuses on the relationship between the duration of subsidized
jobs and the regular job ﬁnding rate. The main hypothesis is that long
duration of subsidized jobs generate locking-in eﬀects for the participants in
these programs. The analysis is based on data from the “natural” experiment
4For males the Likelihood-Ratio test statistic comparing the ﬁrst column of Table 3
with the ﬁrst column of Table 4 is equal to 9.0. Since the critical χ2 − value (95%) for 4
degrees of freedom is equal to 9.5 I cannot reject the restriction. For females the equivalent
LR-test is equal to 7.4, while the critical χ2−value (95%) for 3 degrees of freedom is equal
to 7.8.
5For males the LR-test statistic equals 34.0 which is signiﬁcant, since the critical
χ2 − value for 9 degrees of freedom is 16.9. For males the LR-test statistic equals 16.4,
which indicates that the hypothesis that the treatment eﬀect is not aﬀected by observed
characteristics of the women cannot be rejected.
20in the Slovak labor market of the mid 1990s, where the maximum length of
a so called Publicly Useful Job was extended ﬁrst from 6 to 9 months and
then from 9 to 12 months. The empirical analysis shows that short term
subsidized jobs had a positive eﬀect on the regular job ﬁnding rate. However,
as the ex ante duration of a subsidized job increased this positive eﬀect
became smaller. Locking-in eﬀects seem to have been a relevant phenomenon.
This phenomenon also explains the negative treatment eﬀect of so called
Socially Purposeful Jobs, which were intended to last at least two years.
SPJ had clear negative treatment eﬀects and were more suitable to bring
open unemployment down than they stimulated workers to ﬁnd regular jobs.
Also, in hindsight, it may not have been a wise decision to lengthen the
duration of the PUJ. All in all, it is clear that subsidized jobs can reduce
unemployment durations provided that the subsidy does not last too long.
21References
[1] Abbring, Jaap H., Van den Berg, Gerard J., and Van Ours, Jan C.(1997),
The Eﬀect of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate
from Unemployment to Employment, mimeo, Tinbergen Institute, Am-
sterdam/Rotterdam.
[2] Abbring, Jaap H, and Van den Berg, Gerard J. (1998), The Non-
Parametric Identiﬁcation of Treatment Eﬀects in Duration Models,
mimeo, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
[3] Boeri, Tito (1997), Labor market reforms in transition economies, Ox-
ford Review of Economic Policy, 13, 2: 126-140.
[4] Bonnal, Liliane, Fougère, Denis, Sérandon, Anne (1997), Evaluating
the Impact of French Employment Policies on Individual Labor Market
Histories, Review of Economic Studies,6 8 3 - 7 1 3 .
[5] Burda, Michael and Lubyova, Martina (1995), The Impact of Active
Labor Market Policies: a Closer Look at the Czech and Slovak Republics,
in: David M.G. Newberry (ed.), Tax and Beneﬁt Reform in Central and
Eastern Europe, Center for Economic Policy Research, London.
[6] Calmfors, Lars (1994) Active Labor Market Policy and Unemployment
- a Framework for the Analysis of Crucial Design Features, OECD Eco-
nomic Studies no 22.
[7] Calmfors, Lars (1995), What Can We Expect from Active Labor Market
Policy?, Konjunkturpolitik, 43, 11-30.
[8] Calmfors, Lars, Forslund, Anders, Hemström, Martin (2001), Does Ac-
tive Labor Market Policy Work? Lessons from the Swedish Experiences,
mimeo,I F A U .
22[9] Gritz, Mark (1993), The Impact of Training on the Frequency and Du-
ration of Employment, Journal of Econometrics, 57, 21-51.
[10] Heckman, James J., Lalonde, Robert J., and Smith, Jeﬀrey A. (1999)
The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs,
in: Ashenfelter, Orley and Card, David (eds.) Handbook of Labor Eco-
nomics, Volume 3A, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
[11] Huitfeld, Henrik (2000), Unemployment, Labor Market Programs and
Wage Determination: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics,
Uppsala University, mimeo.
[12] Lalive, Rafael, Van Ours Jan C. and Zweimüller, Josef (2000), The Im-
pact of Active Labor Market Policies and Beneﬁt Entitlement Rules on
the Duration of Unemployment, CentER Discussion Paper, 2000-41.
[13] Lubyova, Martina, and Van Ours, Jan C. (1997), Unemployment Dy-
namics in Eastern Europe; the Case of Slovakia, European Economic
Review, 41, 1997, 925-934.
[14] Lubyova, Martina, and Van Ours, Jan C. (1998), Work incentives and
other eﬀects of the transition to social assistance: evidence from the
Slovak Republic, Empirical Economics, 23, 1998, 121-153.
[15] Lubyova, Martina, and Van Ours, Jan C. (1999), Eﬀects of Active Labor
Market programs on the Transition Rate from Unemployment into Reg-
ular Jobs in the Slovak Republic, Journal of Comparative Economics,
27, 90-112.
[16] Martin, John P., and Grubb, David (2001), What Works and for Whom:
a Review of OECD Countries’ Experience with Active Labor Market
Policies, Working Paper,O E C D ,P a r i s .
23[17] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1994), The
OECD Jobs Study,P a r tI I ,O E C D ,P a r i s .
[18] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1996),
OECD Economic Surveys 1995-1996: The Slovak Republic.P a r i s :
OECD.
[19] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001), Em-
ployment Outlook,P a r i s :O E C D .
[20] Svejnar, Jan (1999) Labor Markets in the Transitional Central and East
European Economies, in: Ashenfelter, Orley and Card, David (eds.)
Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
[ 2 1 ]V a nd e nB e r g ,G e r a r dJ . ,V a nd e rK l a a u w ,B a s ,a n dV a nO u r s ,J a n
C. (1998), Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare
to Work, Discussion Paper, No. 9856, CentER for Economic Research,
Tilburg University.
[22] Van den Berg, Gerard J. (2000), Duration Models: Speciﬁcation,
Identiﬁcation, and Multiple Durations, in: Heckman, James J., and
Leamer, Edward (eds.) Handbook of Econometrics,V o l u m e5 ,A m s t e r -
dam, North-Holland.
[23] Van Ours, Jan C. (2000), Do Active Labor Market Policies Help Unem-
ployed Workers to Find and Keep Regular Jobs?, in: Lechner, Michael,
and Pfeiﬀer,Friedhelm (eds.) Econometric Evaluation of Labor Market
Policies, Physica, Heidelberg, 125-152.
24Table 1 Labor market transitions
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
86,157 =⇒ To SPJ =⇒ To regular job
Unemployed 2,520 (2.9%) 1,868 (74,4%)
=⇒ To PUJ =⇒ To regular job
3,179 (3.7%) 1,522 (48,4%)
=⇒ To regular job
40,218 (47.1%)
=⇒ Othersa)
40,240 (46.4%)
a) Including censored observations
25Table 2 Estimation results baseline modela)
a. males
To job To PUJ To SPJ
Age30-40 -0.03 (0.7) 0.62 (4.1) -0.05 (0.3)
Age40+ -0.20 (4.7) 0.79 (5.3) -0.40 (2.4)
Incompl sec. education 0.05 (1.2) -0.19 (1.4) 0.72 (4.6)
Sec. and higher education -0.01 (0.3) -1.14 (5.7) 0.53 (3.4)
Married 0.34 (9.3) -0.60 (4.7) 0.42 (2.9)
Disabled -0.34 (4.6) -0.19 (0.9) -0.32 (1.1)
Roma -0.75 (8.8) 0.12 (0.6) -1.30 (3.6)
Hungarian -0.17 (2.6) 0.19 (1.1) 0.05 (0.2)
Urate/10 -0.18 (4.3) 0.74 (5.0) -0.15 (1.2)
Mass points
ua -3.66 (15.2) -7.03 (26.1) −∞
ub − ua 1.19 (5.6) -2.17 (2.8) -5.54 (21.1)
Duration dependence
3-6 months 0.08 (1.9) - -0.04 (0.2)
6-9 months -0.10 (1.9) - -0.38 (2.0)
9-12 months -0.23 (3.8) - -0.38 (2.0)
12-24 months -0.21 (3.8) 1.66 (10.2) 0.26 (1.4)
> 24 months 0.10 (1.2) 2.38 (14.5) 0.89 (3.5)
Heterogeneity
α -0.88 (2.6)
Treatment eﬀect (δ) - 0.67 (3.3) -0.93 (7.7)
-Loglikelihood 26,448.1
a) t-values in parentheses
26b. females
To job To PUJ To SPJ
Age30-40 -0.31 (5.4) 0.42 (1.6) -0.21 (0.8)
Age40+ -0.19 (3.4) 0.31 (1.2) -0.01 (0.0)
Incompl sec. education 0.02 (0.4) -0.44 (1.4) 0.73 (3.3)
Sec. and higher education -0.10 (2.1) 0.45 (2.4) -0.33 (1.6)
Married -0.07 (1.4) 0.08 (0.4) -0.39 (1.8)
Disabled -0.15 (1.7) -0.25 (0.8) -0.94 (2.1)
Roma -0.67 (6.7) -0.36 (1.1) -1.43 (2.9)
Hungarian -0.15 (1.7) -0.46 (1.4) -0.35 (1.1)
Urate/10 -0.16 (2.9) 0.67 (3.2) 0.65 (3.6)
Mass points
ua -3.49 (11.1) -8.74 (18.0) −∞
ub − ua 1.41 (5.5) −∞ -5.93 (14.5)
Duration dependence
3-6 months -0.07 (1.4) - -0.04 (0.2)
6-9 months -0.24 (3.7) - -0.10 (0.4)
9-12 months -0.29 (3.8) - -0.10 (0.4)
12-24 months -0.28 (3.6) 2.01 (6.6) 0.26 (0.9)
> 24 months -0.15 (1.2) 2.95 (9.6) 1.25 (3.0)
Heterogeneity
-0.25 (0.6)
Treatment eﬀect (δ) - 0.64 (2.0) -0.95 (5.0)
-Loglikelihood 16350.4
a) t-values in parentheses
27Table 3 Separate treatment eﬀects - model with unobserved het-
erogeneitya)
Males Femalesb)
δ
1993
puj 1.52 (4.7)
δ
1994
puj − δ
1993
puj -0.52 (1.8) δ
1994
puj 1.00 (2.6)
δ
1995
puj − δ
1993
puj -1.07 (3.7) δ
1995
puj − δ
1994
puj -0.50 (1.7)
δ
1993
spj -1.08 (6.7) δ
1993
spj -1.18 (4.1)
δ
1994
spj − δ
1993
spj 0.23 (1.1) δ
1994
spj − δ
1993
spj 0.37 (1.1)
δ
1995
spj − δ
1993
spj 0.48 (2.0) δ
1995
spj − δ
1993
spj 0.60 (1.6)
-Loglikelihood 26435.6 -Loglikelihood 16344.9
a) t-values in parentheses
b) In 1993 there was only 1 female starting on a PUJ. Therefore, there is no
separate estimate for 1993
28Table 4 Combining treatment eﬀectsa)
Males Females
Constant 1.37 (5.4) 1.80 (5.5) 1.33 (3.2) 1.05 (1.6)
Ex ante duration - 6 -0.13 (8.3) -0.13 (8.5) -0.13 (5.4) -0.12 (5.2)
Age 30-40 - -0.24 (1.5) - 0.50 (1.6)
Age 40+ - -0.03 (0.2) - 0.20 (0.6)
Incompl sec. education - -0.44 (2.8) - -0.43 (1.3)
Sec. and higher education - -0.37 (2.0) - -0.32 (1.2)
Married - -0.30 (2.5) - -0.03 (0.1)
Disabled - 0.24 (1.0) - 0.19 (0.4)
R o m a -0 . 4 2 ( 1 . 9 )-0 . 4 6 ( 0 . 9 )
Hungarian - 0.18 (1.0) - -0.14 (0.3)
Urate/10 - -0.07 (0.5) - 0.17 (0.7)
-Loglikelihood 26440.1 26423.1 16348.6 16340.4
a) t-values in parentheses
297 Appendix
7.1 Data used in the analysis
Deﬁnition of variables used in the analysis:
• Age 30-40: Age of the individual in 1998 is between 30 and 40 years
• Age 40+: Age of the individual in 1998 is over 40 years. In combination
with the previous variable this means that individuals of age below 30
years are the reference group
• Incomplete secondary education: Dummy variable with the value 1
if the individual has incomplete secondary education (without leaving
examination)
• Secondary and higher education: Dummy variable with the value 1
if the individual has one of the following educational levels: complete
secondary - apprentice, complete secondary - grammar, complete sec-
ondary vocational, higher secondary, university, scientiﬁc( g r a d u a t e ,
etc.). In combination with the previous variable this means that in-
dividuals without education and individuals with basic education or
apprentices are the reference group
• Married: Dummy variable with the value 1 if the individual is married.
The reference group consists of individuals that are single, divorced,
widow(er) or cohabitating
• Disabled: Dummy variable with the value 1 if the individual has small
restrictions to work, is disabled, heavily disabled or very heavily dis-
abled. The reference group consists of individuals with no degree of
disability
• Roma: Dummy variable with the value 1 if the individual has the
nationality indicator Roma
30• Hungarian: Dummy variable with the value 1 if the individual has a
Hungarian nationality. In combination with the previous variable this
means that Slovaks and other nationalities are the reference group
• Unemployment rate/10: district unemployment rate in December 1992
divided by 10.
Table A1 presents the number of observations by district of the gross sample
and the net sample. Table A2 shows for each of the variables the mean,
minimum and maximum.
31Table A1 Number of observations by district
District Gross sample Net sample
Males Females Males Females
Banská Bystica 3932 3458 750 662
Bardejov 1898 903 375 168
Bratislava 1 947 952 184 195
Bratislava 5 1494 716 326 156
Dolný Kubín 1652 1135 324 230
Martin 3144 2677 674 528
Michalovce 4242 3443 846 680
Nitra 6930 5284 1380 528
Pezinok 2145 1722 441 370
Rimavská Sobota 4117 2705 833 554
Roˇ zˇ nava 2825 2365 550 465
Spišská Nová 2086 1250 422 252
Trenˇ cin 3530 2427 695 505
Vranov nad Topl’ou 2489 1531 483 303
ˇ Ziar nad Hronom 1653 1298 332 237
ˇ Zilina 6294 1298 1229 932
Total 49378 36779 9844 7323
32Table A2 Mean minimum and maximum of variables (net sample)
Males (N=9844) Females (N=7323)
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Age 30-40 0.28 0 1 0.30 0 1
Age 40+ 0.35 0 1 0.37 0 1
Incompl sec. education 0.23 0 1 0.17 0 1
Sec. and higher education 0.30 0 1 0.44 0 1
Married 0.52 0 1 0.64 0 1
Disabled 0.05 0 1 0.05 0 1
Roma 0.04 0 1 0.04 0 1
Hungarian 0.06 0 1 0.06 0 1
Urate 12.5 5.6 17.2 12.4 5.6 17.2
337.2 Additional parameter estimates
Table A3 Estimation results without unobserved heterogeneitya)
a. males
To job To PUJ To SPJ
Age30-40 -0.04 (1.1) 0.66 (4.9) -0.07 (0.5)
Age40+ -0.19 (5.1) 0.75 (5.9) -0.38 (2.4)
Incompl sec. education 0.04 (1.1) -0.14 (1.1) 0.69 (4.6)
Sec. and higher education -0.03 (0.8) -1.07 (5.6) 0.48 (3.2)
Married 0.29 (9.1) -0.42 (4.1) 0.30 (2.2)
Disabled -0.29 (4.4) -0.34 (1.9) -0.20 (0.7)
Roma -0.62 (8.3) -0.20 (1.2) -1.02 (2.9)
Hungarian -0.14 (2.3) 0.07 (0.5) 0.13 (0.6)
Urate/10 -0.15 (4.1) 0.63 (4.6) -0.07 (0.6)
Mass points
ua -2.73 (47.6) -7.78 (33.9) -5.93 (25.3)
Duration dependence
3-6 months 0.04 (1.0) - -0.11 (0.6)
6-9 months -0.18 (3.7) - -0.54 (2.9)
9-12 months -0.34 (6.1) - -0.54 (2.9)
12-24 months -0.38 (9.0) 1.87 (12.2) -0.05 (0.3)
> 24 months -0.17 (3.4) 2.69 (17.8) 0.30 (1.5)
Treatment eﬀect - 0.09 (1.2) -0.46 (4.7)
-Loglikelihood 26,458.8
a) t-values in parentheses
34b. females
To job To PUJ To SPJ
Age30-40 -0.27 (5.4) 0.32 (1.3) -0.03 (0.1)
Age40+ -0.18 (3.8) 0.25 (0.9) 0.09 (0.4)
Incompl sec. education -0.01 (0.3) -0.39 (1.2) 0.66 (3.2)
Sec. and higher education -0.08 (2.0) 0.42 (2.3) -0.28 (1.4)
Married -0.06 (1.4) 0.07 (0.3) -0.42 (2.2)
Disabled -0.14 (1.8) -0.26 (0.8) -0.90 (2.1)
Roma -0.58 (6.4) -0.54 (1.8) -1.14 (2.5)
Hungarian -0.12 (1.6) -0.52 (1.6) -0.30 (1.0)
Urate/10 -0.15 (3.1) 0.63 (3.0) 0.76 (4.3)
Mass points
ua -2.56 (33.1) -9.28 (20.3) -6.75 (20.5)
Duration dependence
3-6 months -0.14 (2.6) - -0.15 (0.6)
6-9 months -0.35 (5.7) - -0.33 (1.3)
9-12 months -0.45 (6.5) - -0.33 (1.3)
12-24 months -0.54 (10.3) 2.25 (7.5) -0.20 (0.8)
> 24 months -0.60 (9.3) 3.38 (11.5) 0.27 (1.0)
Treatment eﬀect - 0.05 (0.4) -0.16 (1.1)
-Loglikelihood 16,358.4
a) t-values in parentheses
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Figure 1a Exit rates out of unemployment 
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Figure 1b Exit rates out of unemployment 
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Figure 2a Exit rates to a job 
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Figure 2b Exit rates to a job 
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